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Abstract: Orchestrated container virtualization, such as Docker/Kubernetes, is an attractive option to transfer complex
IT ecosystems into the cloud. However, this is associated with new challenges for IT security. Containers
store sensitive data with the code. The orchestration decides at run-time which containers are executed on
which host. Application code is obtained as images from external sources at run-time. Typically, the operator
of the cloud is not the owner of the data. Therefore, the configuration of the orchestration is critical, and an
attractive target for attackers. A prominent option to secure IT infrastructures is to use security guidelines from
agencies, such as Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security. In this work, we analyze the module
”SYS.1.6 Container” from this agency. We want to find out how suitable this module is to secure a typical
Kubernetes scenario. Our scenario is a classical 3-tier architecture with front end, business logic and database-
back end. We show that with orchestration, the protection needs for the entire Kubernetes cluster in terms of
confidentiality, integrity and availability automatically become ”high” as soon as a sensitive data object is
processed or stored in any container. Our analysis has shown that the SYS.1.6 module is generally suitable.
However, we have identified three additional threats. Two of them could be exploited automatically, as soon
as a respective vulnerability in Docker/Kubernetes appears.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2019, a quarter of all company data was stored
in a cloud (Joseph McKendrick, 2018). In this con-
text, container virtualization is frequently used. This
allows planning, operating and maintaining complex
applications, such as database management systems
(DBMS) in an agile and cost-efficient way, which is
also compatible with DevOps approaches. A promi-
nent container virtualization is the open source project
Docker (Docker Inc., 2020b). Docker containers al-
low managing applications, such as DBMS as sepa-
rate building blocks of a large IT Infrastructure. For
example, it is possible to place a preconfigured op-
erating system image together with a preconfigured
image of a database management system in a con-
tainer. This container can be evaluated it in a test
environment, transferred to a productive system and
duplicated on several host computers if the demand
for resources increases.
In this paper, we use DBMS as our running ex-
ample. The Docker repository (Docker Inc., 2020a)
currently lists 6,238 container images with the key-
word ”database”. This includes relational DBMS,
such as Oracle, Postgres or SQL Server, and special
systems, such as Couchbase, MongoDB or MariaDB.
In addition to the operating system image and one or
more application images, a container can also contain
sensitive company data or personal information. To
manage different container instances across multiple
hosts, an orchestration like Kubernetes (The Kuber-
netes Authors, 2020b) is frequently used. The orches-
tration monitors and assigns resources, such as stor-
age or computing power, controls network access and
isolates the container instances against each other. It
also allocates containers to virtual machines and vir-
tual machines to physical hosts in a data center.
Due to the orchestration, the security measures
implemented in a DBMS lose their importance as the
first line of defense between sensitive data, users and
public networks. The DBMS cannot control the re-
sources of its tenants, if the orchestration can with-
draw resources from containers (Kanchanadevi et al.,
2019). The orchestration also controls which con-
tainer can exchange data with other ones i.e., ignores
the settings stored in the DBMS (Gao et al., 2017).
Each container imports its own DBMS instance via
an image. Typically, each DBMS instance is only re-
sponsible for one database, and uses only one admin-
istrator and one user account. Therefore, the isolation
between the DBMS clients is forwarded to the con-
tainer isolation (Mardan and Kono, 2020). Since the
container instances only exist in the main memory,
persistent data must be stored on another host. This
means that the protection needs for the managed data
must be transferred from the DBMS to the container
virtualization and orchestration, and consider multi-
ple hosts in a complex IT ecosystem. To this end, the
company’s security concept must be reworked.
A number of standardized compilations of secu-
rity guidelines exist, which allow developing security
concepts in a structured way. Prominent examples are
the IT-Grundschutz (BSI, 2011) from the Federal Of-
fice for Information Security (BSI), the ISO 27001
certification (BSI, 2014), or the Information Security
Practice Guides (NIST, 2020) from the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In this
work, we focus on the IT-Grundschutz approach from
BSI. Currently, the BSI is developing the module
”SYS.1.6 Container” (BSI, 2020). This module was
published as a community draft in 2018 and refined
in 2020 to consider orchestration. It is still not part of
the official IT-Grundschutz Compendium. We have
shown in a preliminary work that the module SYS.1.6
is practically applicable to secure containers, which
are executed on a single host system (Haar and Buch-
mann, 2019). In this work, we concentrate on orches-
tration, which makes this issue even more complex.
By using a typical database scenario, we analyze the
suitability of the new module SYS.1.6 to secure an
orchestrated container virtualization.
Since Kubernetes is the most frequently used plat-
form for orchestration (Vaughan-Nichols S., 2020),
we will implement a protection according to IT-
Grundschutz for a typical Kubernetes scenario. This
scenario consists of a DBMS with customer data, a
business logic including payment system, and a web
application as a front end. We model the information
domain for our Kubernetes system according to BSI
standard 200-2 (BSI, 2017a). Then we determine the
protection needs and analyze the elementary threats
described in the BSI module SYS.1.6 Container. Be-
cause some data objects in the database in the infor-
mation domain require the protection need ”high”, we
will do a risk analysis according to BSI standard 200-
3 (BSI, 2017b) in a second step to identify and eval-
uate additional threats to our Kubernetes System. Fi-
nally, we generalize our findings.
We have found out that in an orchestrated con-
tainer virtualization system, a single data object with
the protection need ”high” for confidentiality, in-
tegrity or availability ensures that the entire system
must be assigned with this protection need. This is,
because the orchestration decides at run-time which
instances of a specific container are running and
where. Our analysis has shown that the SYS.1.6 mod-
ule is suitable for securing such a scenario. How-
ever, we have found three additional threats that are
not considered in the module SYS.1.6. Two of these
threats could even be used to implement an automated
exploit, as soon as an attacker finds a corresponding
vulnerability in the software used. Note that SYS.1.6
from the BSI considers the same set of security risks
as the ”Application Container Security Guide” (NIST,
2017) from NIST. Thus, our results can be transferred
to the Information Security Practice Guides.
Structure of the work: Section 2 describes
Docker, Kubernetes and IT-Grundschutz. In Sec-
tions 3 and 4 we perform a risk analysis and com-
pare our findings with those from BSI. In Section 5
we generalize our findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we explain the standard protec-
tion and risk analysis according to BSI, the module
SYS.1.6 (BSI, 2020) and the basics of Docker and
Kubernetes.
2.1 BSI Standard-Protection
The BSI standard 200-2 (BSI, 2017a) defines six steps
to secure a typical IT system. We use these steps as
our research method.
1. The scope must be defined first. The scope is the
information domain to be protected.
2. In the structure analysis, the processes, applica-
tions, IT-Systems, infrastructures, etc. within the
scope are defined as target objects.
3. The third step defines protection needs for the
business processes, the information processed and
the information technology used.
4. In the modeling step, the modules of the IT-
Grundschutz-Kompendium (BSI, 2019) are used
to identify security measures for the target objects,
depending on the protection needs.
5. The IT-Grundschutz-Check finds out if the im-
plemented security measures are sufficient to ful-
fill the protection needs.
6. A risk analysis must be implemented if a target
object has protection needs above normal, if if no
BSI module exists for a target object, or if a target
object is operated in an unusual way.
The risk analysis identifies additional threats that
are not considered in the modules. The BSI standard
200-3 (BSI, 2017b) provides a set of questions that
help to perform such a risk analysis. These questions
Table 1: Standard-Requirement SYS.1.6.A26
Requirement Description
SYS.1.6.A26 Service accounts in containers
The accounts used by the processes inside a container application SHOULD not have permis-
sions on the host that executes the container environment. If this is necessary, these permis-
sions SHOULD be restricted on the data that is absolutely necessary.
should be answered by experts, employees, adminis-
trators and users for each target object:
• Which ”force majeure” threats are relevant?
• Are there organizational deficiencies that have an
impact on information security?
• Can the safety be compromised by human errors?
• Do technical failures result in security problems?
• Which threats can arise from external attacks?
• Is it possible for employees to willfully impair the
operation of the target object?
• Is it possible that objects outside of the informa-
tion system cause a risk?
• What information is provided by the manufac-
turer’s documentation and third parties?
2.2 Module SYS.1.6: Container and
Application Container Security
In the BSI-Grundschutz-Compendium (BSI, 2019),
each module secures a specific target object. A mod-
ule contains a description of the target object, the ob-
jectives of the protection, cross-references to other
objects. The main part of each module is a descrip-
tion of specific threats for the target object, together
with a set of requirements to avoid these threats. Fi-
nally, each module lists standard security measures.
The requirements are divided into (1) basic re-
quirements that must be implemented as quickly as
possible, (2) standard requirements that should be
implemented to achieve basic protection, and (3) re-
quirements that must be implemented when there is
an increased need for protection. With pre-defined
terms like SHOULD or MUST, the module points out
the importance of the requirements. Table 1 shows
an example of the requirement A26 of the SYS.1.6
module. A26 belongs to the level ”standard require-
ments”.
To secure an orchestrated container virtualization
with Kubernetes, the BSI has published the module
SYS.1.6 ”Container” (BSI, 2020) in a preliminary
version. To provide an overview, we briefly list the
basic requirements (Table 2), standard requirements
(Table 3) and the requirements for increased protec-
tion needs (Table 4).
Table 2: Basic requirements
ID Basic requirements
SYS.1.6.A1 Container use
SYS.1.6.A2 Separation of container apps
SYS.1.6.A3 Administration and orchestration
SYS.1.6.A4 Hardening of the host system
SYS.1.6.A5 Separation of containers
SYS.1.6.A6 Trustworthy images
SYS.1.6.A7 Hardening software in a container
SYS.1.6.A8 Persistence of logging data
SYS.1.6.A9 Persistence of user data
SYS.1.6.A10 Storing login information
SYS.1.6.A11 Administrative remote access
Table 3: Standard requirements
ID Standard requirements
SYS.1.6.A11 Policy for operation and images
SYS.1.6.A12 One application/one service per
container
SYS.1.6.A13 Image and configuration approval
SYS.1.6.A14 Updating containers
SYS.1.6.A15 Immutability of the container
SYS.1.6.A16 Limiting container resources
SYS.1.6.A17 Mass storage for containers
SYS.1.6.A18 Securing administration networks
SYS.1.6.A19 Separate input and output systems
SYS.1.6 A20 Backup of configuration data
SYS.1.6 A21 Unprivileged container execution
SYS.1.6 A22 Securing auxiliary processes
SYS.1.6 A23 Administrative remote access
SYS.1.6 A24 Identity and auth. management
SYS.1.6 A25 Service accounts for containers
SYS.1.6 A26 Accounts for services in containers
SYS.1.6 A27 Monitoring containers
SYS.1.6 A28 Securing the image registry
Table 4: Requirements for high protection needs
ID Requirements for high prot.
SYS.1.6.A29 Automated container auditing
SYS.1.6.A30 Private image repositories
SYS.1.6.A31 Strict access policies
SYS.1.6.A32 Host-based intrusion detection
SYS.1.6.A33 Container micro-segmentation
SYS.1.6.A34 Container high availability
SYS.1.6.A35 Encrypted data storage
SYS.1.6.A36 Encrypted communication
Note that the english translation of the module
”SYS.1.6 Container” is not available at the moment,
because the module has not been finalized yet. How-
ever, the module borrows from the ”Application Con-
tainer Security Guide” of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) (NIST, 2017). Be-
cause of this, both approaches handle the same kinds
of risks. In particular, the basic- and standard require-
ments and requirements for a higher protection needs
from the BSI module correspond to the countermea-
sures in section four of the Application Container Se-
curity Guide. Thus, our findings can be transferred to
the Application Container Security Guide.
2.3 Database systems in Docker
The container virtualization is well suited for the op-
eration of a DBMS (Seybold et al., 2018). In the fol-
lowing, we outline how a database system can be im-
plemented with Docker.
Docker is based on a Linux operating system.
Unlike classical virtual machines, such as VMWare
or VirtualBox, Docker containers have access to
parts of the operating system of the host. The
Docker architecture (Docker Inc., 2020b) consists of
Docker Client, Docker Daemon, Docker Registry and
the Docker objects (images, Docker files, contain-
ers). The Docker Engine includes Docker Client and
Docker Daemon. Each Docker container contains two
main directories: /bin contains the binary files and /lib
contains the dynamic libraries and kernel modules of
the operating system that are required for the func-
tionality of a container. Client and daemon can run on
the same host. Alternatively, it is possible to execute
them on different hosts connected via VPN. Com-
munication takes place via a Representational State
Transfer interface (REST-API), a UNIX socket or an-
other network interface.
Out of the box, Docker loads images from the
Docker Hub. It is also possible to configure Docker
for a private image repository (Docker Trusted Reg-
istry). The images contain the functionality of the
container. In detail, all files in an image are imported
into the directory structure of the container. The
Docker Hub provides preconfigured images for ser-
vices like relational databases, or no-SQL databases,
web servers, firewalls, mail servers, spam filters,
servlet engines and much more. It is one of the best
practices that each container implements only a sin-
gle service. Therefore, a typical Docker environment
consists of multiple containers. Several instances of
the same container can be executed in parallel on dif-
ferent hosts, to distribute the load or to improve the
reliability of the system.
Without further means, containers only exist in the
main memory of the host. If an application modifies
files of a container, those changes are lost if the con-
tainer is shut down. For DBMS and other stateful ap-
plications, Docker uses Volume Plugins (Docker Inc.,
2020a) to make changes in the data persistent on sep-
arate hosts. These hosts can be part of the Docker
runtime environment. It is also possible to use ex-
ternal storage from cloud providers. In this way, the
data generated within a container survives the end of
its container, and the storage requirements within the
Docker architecture are reduced.
2.4 Orchestration and Kubernetes
Orchestration means the automation of IT-
Services (TechnologyAdvice, 2020). In the context
of container virtualization, the Orchestration allows
to efficiently control complex IT-Service landscapes
in the company. The most commonly used platform
for orchestrating containers is Kubernetes (Vaughan-
Nichols S., 2020). Other platforms for orchestrating
containers use similar concepts, e.,g., Apache
Mesos (Foundation, 2020), AWS Fargate (Services,
2020) or Cloudify (Ltd., 2006). See (A., 2019) for a
detailed description.
Kubernetes is an open source platform developed
by Google whose primary task is to monitor and
control the resource utilization of individual contain-
ers on the respective hosts. Kubernetes can start,
shut down or move container instances over multiple
hosts depending on the workload of the system and
free resources of the hosts. Furthermore, Kubernetes
can monitor the state of containers, it allows to con-
figure authorizations, migrate containers and much
more (Sayfan, 2018). In the following we introduce
the basic Kubernetes components:
etcd The master node manages a storage for config-
uration data (etcd). In the etcd the configuration
data of all containers and services in the Kuber-
netes cluster are stored as key-value pairs (The
etcd authors, 2020).
Kubectl The Kubectl tool transmits commands for
administration to the master node (Oliveira et al.,
2016). With Kubectl, the resources of the PODs
can be controlled, the logs of the containers can
be called up, authorizations can be set and much
more.
Kubelet Every worker node has a so-called kubelet.






















Figure 1: Example System with Kubernetes architecture from (Oliveira et al., 2016)
stopped and monitored within this kubelet. Con-
trol and status information is transmitted to and
received from the master node via a REST proto-
col.
Kubernetes cluster The combination of worker and
master nodes, as well as other storage and network
resources within a Kubernetes network is known
as a Kubernetes cluster.
POD One or more containers are combined into a
POD for control reasons. Each POD and all the
containers it contains are assigned the same IP ad-
dress, which is only available within the Kuber-
netes cluster. Several PODs can be operated on
a worker node. If a POD is terminated, all con-
tainers operated in it are also terminated (Sayfan,
2018).
Proxy Each worker node has a proxy. This forwards
TCP/UDP packets, which come from the user to
the individual PODs for example.
REST API server The REST API server is the cen-
tral component that enables the user to estab-
lish communication between master and worker
nodes (Sayfan, 2018). REST stands for REpre-
sentational State Transfer, i.e., a stateless commu-
nication interface in which every data packet con-
tains all information necessary for its processing.
Scheduler The scheduler is responsible for the mon-
itoring and planning of the individual PODs.
The required status information for the individ-
ual PODs is communicated via the REST API
server (Baier, 2017).
Worker / Master Node A worker node is a physical
host or a virtual machine on which containers are
operated. The master node is the host that is re-
sponsible for controlling and monitoring the re-
sources on the worker nodes. He can also start ad-
ditional containers in the worker nodes or switch
off containers that are not required.
Figure 1 describes a typical Kubernetes cluster.
The dashed line marks the internal network, arrows
show the flow of information between the compo-
nents. The gray area represents the Kubernetes clus-
ter. The components of the Kubernetes cluster are
represented by rectangles. The storage node makes
the data of the Kubernetes cluster persistent. We fo-
cus to the Kubernetes cluster and assume that all other
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Figure 2: Example-System Web-Shop
3 SECURING KUBERNETES
In this section, we describe a typical Kubernetes
scenario. For this scenario, we develop the security
needs of the BSI level ”Standard Protection”.
3.1 Information Domain
Szenario: A retailer stores a relational database with
data from a web shop. The data include customer
data, orders and payment transactions. The web shop
is also equipped with an Internet payment system that
securely processes payment transactions through var-
ious channels via a service provider. For this purpose,
the retailer has divided a classical 3-tier architecture
into three Docker containers, as shown in Figure 2:
The first container contains the front end. This in-
cludes a web server with a PHP-based web applica-
tion. The second container contains the business logic
and the payment system as a set of REST-based mi-
croservices written in Java. A Postgres DBMS with
the database is housed in the third container. All
containers are managed by Kubernetes. Kubernetes
does not use further add-ons. Each host in the Kuber-
netes cluster contains a POD that can run multiple in-
stances of the containers. The Kubernetes scheduler
decides, depending on the workload, how many in-
stances of which container are executed within which
POD. Only the database is executed in a single in-
stance, so that there is no need to synchronize multi-
ple databases. The Kubernetes cluster runs in an on-
premise environment. Thus, the retailer is not only
responsible for the containers, but also for the physi-
cal infrastructure in his data center.
According to BSI standard 200-2 (BSI, 2017a),
the information domain must be modeled before the
protection needs are determined. Table 5 contains all
categories of data objects from our scenario. Table 6
contains all applications that are required to operate
the web shop. The software used is summarized in
table 7. Table 8 shows all host systems within the Ku-
bernetes cluster. All hosts belong to the same data
center (DC1). The master node (S0) and the worker
nodes (S1, S2) controlled by it are housed on their
own hosts. Instances of the containers (C1 - C3) with
web applications, microservices and DBMS run on
the worker nodes.
Table 5: Data of the Information Domain
Nr. Data Object Description
D1 Personal Data Data from a natural per-
son
D2 Payload Data from applications
and service operations




Data that controls the sys-
tem behavior
D5 Log Data Data on past operations
and transactions
Because we concentrate on securing the Kuber-
netes cluster, we have summarized all the hardware
and the operating system under S0 to S2 ”Host sys-
Table 6: Applications of the Information Domain



























Table 7: Software of the Information Domain
Nr. Description Data IT System
SSW1 Docker Soft-
ware




tem”. In the following, we assume that these objects
are already protected according to IT-Grundschutz.
3.2 Protection Needs
The aim of defining protection needs is to find out
which protective measures are appropriate for the re-
spective objects in the information system. According
to the standard 200-2 (BSI, 2017a), the BSI defines
three protection need categories ”normal”, ”high” and
”very high”. In the following we will define the pro-
tection needs for our Kubernetes cluster. We use the
protection need categories proposed by the BSI.
We start defining the protection needs by deter-
mining the protection needs of the individual data ob-
jects (D1-D4), which are stored, processed and trans-
ferred between the containers within our Kubernetes
cluster. In the next step, the data protection needs
are passed on to the applications (A1-A4) that use the
corresponding data, and from there to the individual
worker nodes (S1 and S2) and the master node (S0).
This means that the protection needs of the data stored
in the database are transferred to the container with
the database application and to all other containers
that work on this database. The protection needs are
then transferred to the Kubernetes cluster and from
there to the physical hosts.
If data with different protection needs is stored in
the same Kubernetes cluster, the highest of these pro-
tection need is assigned to the entire Kubernetes clus-
ter. This results in a special case for an orchestrated
container virtualization:
The individual worker nodes are all connected to
each other via a central master node. This master node
Table 8: Host-Systems of the Information Domain
Nr. Descript. Data Platform Loc.


















can access all data of the individual worker nodes.
E.g. on the customer data in the database, as well as
on the configuration data and the applications loaded
via image. Depending on its configuration at runtime,
the orchestration controls which containers are started
in which POD.
For this reason, the protection needs of each in-
dividual worker node are passed on to the entire Ku-
bernetes cluster and finally to the entire information
domain. In addition, continuous availability of the
Kubernetes cluster is only guaranteed if at least one
worker node and the master node are operational.
Therefore, only the highest protection need with re-
gard to confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
data have to be analyzed to determine the protection
needs. From there, the protection needs are passed on
to all containers, all PODs that manage these contain-
ers, and all worker nodes that execute the PODs.
This means for our application scenario:
• Confidentiality: D1 and D3 store personal data,
which always have at least the protection need
”high”. The orchestration determines at runtime
on which worker node container instances with
DBMS and the other applications are executed.
For this reason, confidentiality must be ”high” for
every worker node. The same applies to the mas-
ter node, as it is controls the worker nodes. This is
why the entire information system has a high need
for protection with regard to confidentiality.
• Integrity: A central service in our scenario is
the processing of customer payment transactions.
Payment data (D1, D2) must not be changed with-
out authorization. Because it is also not known in
advance on which worker node the payment ser-
vice is running, the protection needs of the infor-
mation system with regard to integrity are ”high”.
• Availability: If one of the applications (A1-A4) is
discontinued, the web shop is out of service. For
this reason, the availability must be ”high” for any
target object in the entire information domain.
4 KUBERNETES THREATS
In the previous section, we have learned that the
security demand for the entire system is ”high” for
integrity, confidentiality and availability. This is due
to the fact that the orchestration decides at run-time on
which host sensible data objects are managed. For any
risk level above ”normal”, BSI standard 200-3 (BSI,
2017b) requires us to do a risk analysis to (i) identify
and (ii) assess additional threats.
4.1 Identifying additional Threats
We performed a risk analysis as described in Sec-
tion 2.1. Our experts were our part-time stu-
dents, which are employees of the IT-Departments
of Deutsche Telekom AG and T-Systems GmbH with
many years of professional experience. The first step
of the risk analysis is to identify additional threats to
our Kubernetes cluster. The result of this step is sum-
marized in table 9.
Our experts have identified 10 different additional
threats for our scenario. Seven of them are identical
to the threats which we have already identified in our
previous work on container virtualization without or-
chestration, i.e., we were able to confirm our results
from (Haar and Buchmann, 2019). By now, those
threats are also part of the BSI module (BSI, 2020).
The right column contains three additional threats the
BSI has not yet identified. Tables 12–14 contain a de-
scription of those threats in detail.




Orchestration with insecure tools
Container breakout
Data loss due to lack of persistence
Loss of confidentiality of login information
Unauthorized modification of configuration data
Not identified in SYS.1.6
Bad planning of etcd
Compromising the nodes
Unauthorized access to the etcd
4.2 Risk Assessment
For each additional threat, the BSI standard (BSI,
2017b) requires a qualitative risk assessment to quan-
tify the potential danger. In the following, we per-
form this risk assessment for the three risks the mod-
ule SYS.1.6 does not consider so far.
The risk is the product of the frequency of oc-
currence and the extent of the damage (BSI, 2017b).
Therefore, we must define a categorization of occur-
rences and damages, which is specific for our sce-
nario. The tables 10 and 11 contain our risk assess-
ment.
Table 10: Extent of Damage
Negligible
The availability of one or more nodes is impaired
for a few minutes. The integrity or confidentiality
of data that has normal protection needs is compro-
mised.
Considerable
The availability of one or more nodes can only be
restored by importing a backup. The integrity or
confidentiality of data that has a high need for pro-
tection is impaired.
Existence-threatening
The availability of all nodes in the Kubernetes clus-
ter is affected. The integrity or confidentiality of
data that has a very high protection need is im-
paired.
Table 11: Frequency of Occurrence
Rarely
The risk can be attributed to incorrect behavior,
such as configuration errors or to a software error
and not to an attack.
Medium
An exploit is known, but an automated attack is not
possible.
Frequently
An exploit is known that can be used to perform an
automated attack on a large number of vulnerable
containers.
Tables 12 to 14 contain our risk assessment. Each
table lists the object from the information system to
which the threat relates, the threat itself, the impaired
basic values, frequency of occurrence, extent of dam-
age, risk and an intuitive description.
We already knew from preliminary work (Haar
and Buchmann, 2019) that executing database sys-
tems in a container virtualization leads to new secu-
rity challenges. If the DBMS is operated on its own
host, the operator can directly control which database
and system rights exist, when which security patches
are imported, and when the DBMS is started or shut
down. This becomes more difficult with container vir-
tualization. The orchestration increases these chal-
lenges. Due to the orchestration, a large number of
containers can be started, stopped, modified, recon-




Threat: Bad Planning of etcd Impaired Core Values: Availability
Frequency of Occurrence with-
out add. Measures: medium
Extent of Damage without add.
Measures: considerable
Risk without add. Measures:
high
Description: A bad planning of the key-value-store, which serves as persistent storage for all data of all
clusters (etcd) can be caused by inattentive or untrained personnel. Because the etcd is the central backup
storage for the entire Kubernetes cluster, bad planning means that there is no backup available in case of data
loss due to e.g. Power outages.
Rating: A bad planning of the etcd could occur that entire memory for configuration data of the Kubernetes
cluster is not available. In case of a system failure, access to the backup memory would not be possible. The
result would be a permanent loss of the data. Such a loss of all data would have catastrophic consequences
for business continuity. Accordingly, this risk is to be classified as high.






Impaired Core Values: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
Frequency of Occurrence with-
out add. Measures: frequently
Extent of Damage without add.
Measures: considerable
Risk without add. Measures:
high
Description: An attacker who gains access to one or more worker nodes could view the data processed by
the containers, manipulate them or shut down entire containers.
Rating: A compromise of the worker nodes would affect all three core values. If an attacker compromises
the worker node that includes a customer database, the attacker would have access to all customer data and
he would also be able to change or even delete it. Such an attack would be existence-threatening.




Threat: Unauthorized Access to
the etcd
Impaired Core Values: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
Frequency of Occurrence with-
out add. Measures: frequently
Extent of Damage without add.
Measures: considerable
Risk without add. Measures:
high
Description: Unauthorized access to the etcd can cause considerable damage to all three core values. The
master node represents an attractive target for attackers, because the etcd is located in it. The etcd represents
the backup storage for the entire Kubernetes cluster. Therefore, the security of the etcd is decisive for the
confidentiality, integrity or availability of all objects in the Kubernetes cluster.
Rating: Unauthorized access to the etcd would enable the attacker to view, manipulate or delete all data in
the Kubernetes cluster. Such an attack would be existence-threatening.
figured or relocated at once. Therefore, the orches-
tration is an attractive target for an attacker. The
SYS.1.6 module offers a valuable support when pro-
tecting such a system. However, our risk analysis has
shown that three kubernetes-specific threats are not
included in the module. ”Compromising the nodes”
and ”Unauthorized access to the etcd” are even suit-
able for automatable attacks on the system as soon as
a corresponding vulnerability becomes known.
Furthermore, the risks described are also not in-
cluded in the NIST guideline ”Application Container
Security Guide” from which the BSI module bor-
rows. Thus, our findings from the IT-Grundschutz can
be directly transferred to the cyber security Frame-
work (NIST, 2017).
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss our findings and pro-
vide an outlook on future work.
Application scenarios Our step ”defining protec-
tion needs” was based on a typical Kubernetes sce-
nario which consists of a DBMS, a web application
and customer data. We have found that due to the
maximum principle, the protection needs for confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability for the entire sys-
tem are automatically set to ”high” ’as soon as the
orchestration is involved: Personal data always needs
”high” protection regardless to which system they be-
long. However, a more comprehensive risk analysis
is required for use cases in which the damage effects
can reach an ”existentially threatening, catastrophic
extent” (BSI, 2017a). An example of such an applica-
tion scenario could be a hospital that controls medical
devices via a container solution.
Countermeasures Our work served to determine
whether the module SYS.1.6 Container is sufficient to
secure a database in an orchestrated container virtual-
ization. Our investigations ended with the risk clas-
sification and assessment. For full application of the
IT-Grundschutz, it is necessary to define possible risk
treatment options for the identified additional threats
in a next step, according to BSI standard 200-3. How-
ever, this step is not part of this work because the
measures require information about the specific Ku-
bernetes installation. This cannot be examined on our
abstract level in a generalizable manner.
Add-Ons There are numerous add-ons for Kuber-
netes, such as ”Web UI”, ”DNS” or ”Cluster Log-
ging” (The Kubernetes Authors, 2020a). In this work
we assumed a Kubernetes cluster without any add-
ons. For further investigations, securing Kubernetes
while considering various add-ons is quite important
because add-ons, such as DNS are widely used in
practice. Many add-ons are made available by un-
known third parties. Furthermore due to the addi-
tional code they provide potential vulnerabilities what
makes them attractive targets for attackers.
6 CONCLUSION
Orchestrated container virtualization environ-
ments such as Kubernetes/Docker offer a flexible,
modern approach to build complex applications. Con-
tainers can be quickly assembled from preconfigured
images, and the orchestration automates the manage-
ment of large numbers of container instances across
many hosts. However, this approach brings new chal-
lenges for the protection of database applications.
In this work, we analyzed the BSI module
SYS.1.6 ”Container”, which was extended for orches-
tration in March 2020. For this purpose, we modeled
a complex Kubernetes/Docker scenario. This sce-
nario consisted of three containers with (i) a Postgres
DBMS, (ii) the business logic and a payment system,
and (iii) a web application on an Apache web server.
For this scenario we derived a standard protection and
a risk analysis according to BSI IT-Grundschutz.
Our analysis has shown that the module is suit-
able to secure a complex 3-tier business application in
an orchestrated container environment. However, we
were able to identify three technology-independent,
additional threats that are not considered in SYS.1.6.
Therefore, we recommend to extend the module to in-
clude the threats we have identified.
REFERENCES




Baier, J. (2017). Getting Started with Kubernetes. Packt
Publishing.
BSI (2011). Taking advantage of opportunities – avoid-
ing risks. https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN. Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
BSI (2014). BSI Standards and Certification.
https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ ITGrundschutz/
itgrundschutz node.html. Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik.
BSI (2017a). BSI-Standard 200-2: IT-Grundschutz-
Methodology. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/BSI/Grundschutz/ International/
bsi-standard-2002 en pdf.html. Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
BSI (2017b). BSI-Standard 200-3: Risk Analysis
based on IT-Grundschutz. https://www.bsi.bund.
de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Grundschutz/
International/bsi-standard-2003 en pdf.html. Bun-
desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
BSI (2019). BSI IT-Grundschutz-Compendium Edi-
tion 2019. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/BSI/Grundschutz/ International/
bsi-it-gs-comp-2019.html. Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik.
BSI (2020). SYS.1.6 Container.
Docker Inc. (2020a). Docker Hub. https://hub.docker.com,
accessedNov.2020.
Docker Inc. (2020b). Docker Overview. https:
//docs.docker.com/engine/docker-overview,
accessedNov.2020.
Foundation, T. A. S. (2020). Apache Mesos.
http://mesos.apache.org/.
Gao, X., Gu, Z., Kayaalp, M., Pendarakis, D., and Wang,
H. (2017). Containerleaks: Emerging security threats
of information leakages in container clouds. In
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Confer-
ence on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN),
pages 237–248. IEEE.
Haar, C. and Buchmann, E. (2019). It-grundschutz für die
container-virtualisierung mit dem neuen bsi-baustein
sys. 1.6. In David, K., Geihs, K., Lange, M.,
and Stumme, G., editors, INFORMATIK 2019: 50
Jahre Gesellschaft für Informatik – Informatik für
Gesellschaft, pages 479–492, Bonn. Gesellschaft für
Informatik e.V.
Joseph McKendrick (2018). 2019 IOUG Databases in the
Cloud Survey. Unisphere Research.
Kanchanadevi, P., Kumar, V. A., and Kumar, G. A. (2019).
Optimal resource allocation and load balancing for a
container as a service in a cloud computing. Journal
of Critical Reviews, 7(4):2020.
Ltd., C. P. (2006). Cloudify Cutting Edge Orchestration.
https://cloudify.co/.
Mardan, A. A. A. and Kono, K. (2020). When the virtual
machine wins over the container: Dbms performance
and isolation in virtualized environments. Journal of
Information Processing, 28:369–377.
NIST (2017). Application Container Security Guide. https:
//doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-190. National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology.
NIST (2020). SP 800 series on Information Security and
Cybersecurity Practice Guides. https://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/sp800. National Institute of Standards
and Technology.
Oliveira, C., Lung, L. C., Netto, H., and Rech, L. (2016).
Evaluating raft in docker on kubernetes. In Inter-
national Conference on Systems Science, pages 123–
130. Springer.
Sayfan, G. (2018). Mastering Kubernetes: Master the art
of container management by using the power of Ku-
bernetes, 2nd Edition. Packt Publishing.
Services, A. W. (2020). AWS Fargate.
https://aws.amazon.com/fargate/.
Seybold, D., Hauser, C. B., Eisenhart, G., Volpert, S., and
Domaschka, J. (2018). The impact of the storage
tier: A baseline performance analysis of containerized
dbms. In European Conference on Parallel Process-
ing, pages 93–105. Springer.
TechnologyAdvice (2020). What is Orchestration?
https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/O/orchestration.
html,accessedNov.2020.
The etcd authors (2020). etcd. https://etcd.io/, accessed
Nov. 2020.
The Kubernetes Authors (2020a). Kubernetes Compo-
nents. https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/
components/,accessedNov.2020”.
The Kubernetes Authors (2020b). Kubernetes Overview.
https://kubernetes.io/de/docs/concepts/overview/
what-is-kubernetes/,accessedNov.2020.
Vaughan-Nichols S. (2020). Kubernetes jumps
in popularity. https://www.zdnet.com/article/
kubernetes-jumps-in-popularity/,accessedNov.2020.
